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THE INFLUENCE OF JUSTICE THURGOOD 
MARSHALL ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE 
WENDY B. SCOTT† 
JADA AKERS†† 
AMY WHITE††† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 had the noble goal of 
eliminating discrimination.  Specifically, the Act “addressed and 
prohibited discrimination in public accommodations, public 
school education, federally-funded programs, and private sector 
employment” based on race, sex, religion, and other protected 
classifications.1  Title VII of the Act was implemented to 
eliminate discrimination in the workforce and “created an Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to administer and 
enforce the statute.”2  Congress, however, only gave the EEOC 
“the authority to seek enforcement by ‘informal methods of 
conference, conciliation, and persuasion’ but not the authority to 
compel compliance.”3  As written, Title VII was broad and left 
enforcement ambiguous and violations undefined.4  Thus, 
Congress left the task of determining what constituted a  
 
 
† Dean and Henry Vaughan Watkins and Shelby Watkins McRae Professor of 
Law, Mississippi College School of Law. 
†† Assistant District Attorney in North Carolina’s Prosecutorial District 3A. 
††† Assistant District Attorney in North Carolina’s Prosecutorial District 5. 
1 Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, 
and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 379 (1995). 
2 Id. at 379–80. 
3 Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and 
Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 431, 433 (2005) (footnote omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012)). 
4 Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: 
Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 305, 305–06 (1983). 
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violation of the Act, the standards of pleading, and the proof 
required for successful enforcement of Title VII to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall sat on the Supreme Court during 
the first twenty years of decisions rendered by the Court 
interpreting Title VII.  These seminal decisions transformed Title 
VII from a “poor enfeebled thing”5 into a vehicle for social reform 
that equalized access to the courts by allowing employees to take 
action against private employers’ discriminatory practices.  This 
Article highlights Justice Marshall’s influence on the 
development of Title VII jurisprudence.  Part I presents a brief 
overview of Justice Marshall’s personal and professional life 
before becoming a Justice to show how his experience influenced 
the development of his judicial philosophy.  Part II summarizes 
the Court’s approach to some of the issues left unresolved by 
Congress in the initial passage of Title VII.  Specifically, it 
explores how the Court determined what would constitute a 
violation of Title VII and standards of pleading and proof.  Part 
III examines the changes in the Court’s jurisprudence before 
Justice Marshall retired from the bench. As the majority of 
Justices became less sympathetic to the protection of African 
Americans in the workplace, Justice Marshall’s voice of dissent 
emerged.  Part IV concludes with a discussion of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, which vindicated Justice Marshall’s choice to dissent 
by adopting many of the positions taken in his departure from 
the majority view.  
I. THE MAKING OF A “SOCIAL ENGINEER” 
In a tribute to Justice Marshall, Justice William Brennan 
addressed what he believed made Justice Marshall a unique 
voice on the Court.6  He attributed the unique views of Justice 
Marshall to “the special voice that he added to the Court’s 
deliberations and decisions.”7  He described Justice Marshall’s 
voice as a first person voice of authority and reason with the 
“unwavering message” that “the Constitution’s protections must 
not be denied to anyone and that the Court must give its 
constitutional doctrine the scope and the sensitivity needed to 
5 Belton, supra note 3, at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
6 William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 23, 23 (1991). 
7 Id. 
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assure that result.”8  Justice Brennan believed that what shaped 
Justice Marshall’s judicial voice were his personal experience of 
racial segregation and the years he spent as an advocate “using 
the tools of legal argument to close the gap between 
constitutional ideal and reality.”9  Justice Marshall gained his 
voice while attending college and law school.  He attended 
Lincoln University where faculty and fellow students nurtured 
his belief in racial equality.10  Upon graduating from Lincoln, he 
enrolled in Howard Law School after being refused admission to 
his home state law school at the University of Maryland because 
of his race.11  At Howard, Marshall came under the mentorship of 
Charles Hamilton Houston and was exposed to the “social 
engineering” theory.12 
Houston taught that lawyers should regard themselves as 
engineers of the social order and, as such, must decide how to use 
the law to construct a fair and just society.13  Houston stressed 
that lawyers should understand more than just the legal rules; 
they should also appreciate “the social setting in which the law 
operated.”14  An effective lawyer needs to explain to the courts 
how their decisions impact the lives of everyday people and “how 
rules actually operate[] in society.”15  Houston brought his social 
engineering theory to life through his work with the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) 
along with his mentee, Marshall, who assisted in the execution of 
this theory in the courts.16 
Shortly after joining the cadre of lawyers assembled by 
Houston, Marshall became the General Counsel of the NAACP in 
1938.17  Marshall’s time working with the NAACP “solidified his 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Lynn Adelman, The Glorious Jurisprudence of Thurgood Marshall, 7 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 113, 115 (2013). 
11 U.W. Clemon & Bryan K. Fair, Making Bricks Without Straw: The NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund and the Development of Civil Rights Law in Alabama  
1940–1980, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1121, 1130 & n.49 (2001). 
12 MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND 
THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 6 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 RANDALL WALTON BLAND, JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL: CRUSADER FOR 
LIBERALISM 31 (2001). 
17 Clemon & Fair, supra note 11, at 1131. 
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conviction that a committed and skillful lawyer could accomplish 
a considerable amount in the struggle to create a more just and 
equal society.”18  Influenced by the NAACP’s belief that equality 
was achieved through the courts, Marshall spearheaded a 
campaign to bring cases “throughout the nation and challeng[e] 
segregation by all means necessary.”19 
Marshall used the litigation of these cases to achieve social 
reform and, in doing so, “altered the nation’s legal system and 
created public interest advocacy which in turn legitimized 
American democracy by securing access to the promise of equal 
justice under law for the disadvantaged and powerless in our 
society.”20  As a social engineer, he knew that access to the courts, 
especially the federal courts, was the “primary vehicle to pursue 
equal rights” and the only way to change society.21 
Thus, as Justice Brennan observed, Marshall’s experience as 
an African-American lawyer laid the foundation for his 
unwavering jurisprudential commitment, during his tenure on 
the Court, to secure equality and fairness through the judicial 
process.22  Marshall “was deeply sympathetic to the efforts of 
subordinated groups,”23 and, through his judicial opinions, he 
gave voice to those directly impacted by the Court’s decisions.24  
The opinions he authored in Title VII cases exemplify his belief 
in the social engineering theory and demonstrate his 
endorsement of the idea that Title VII could be “a powerful 
engine for social change by equalizing employment opportunities” 
for all.25  In a nation struggling to move past Jim Crow Era 
segregation, Marshall would interpret Title VII as another 
means to hasten the eradication of discrimination in the 
workplace and employment practices. 
18 Adelman, supra note 10, at 117. 
19 Clemon & Fair, supra note 11, at 1131. 
20 Julius L. Chambers, Thurgood Marshall’s Legacy, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 
1250 (1992). 
21 Taunya Lovell Banks, Thurgood Marshall, the Race Man, and Gender 
Equality in the Courts, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 15, 16 (2010). 
22 Chambers, supra note 20. 
23 Adelman, supra note 10, at 121. 
24 MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL 
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991, at 5 (1997) (citing Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217–18 
(1992); Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1215, 1216 (1992)). 
25 Belton, supra note 3. 
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II. JUSTICE MARSHALL AND THE EARLY YEARS OF TITLE VII 
The Supreme Court first issued its Title VII opinions during 
Justice Marshall’s tenure.  In those opinions, the Court 
determined what constituted a violation of Title VII and how a 
litigant could successfully meet the pleading and proof 
requirements. 
A. Defining Violation 
The Supreme Court issued its first opinion in a Title VII case 
in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.26  Phillips raised the issue of 
whether an employer’s practice of hiring men, but not women, 
with school-aged children constituted a violation of Title VII.27  
Phillips commenced an action under Title VII alleging that she 
had been denied employment because of her sex since the 
employer was not accepting job applications from women with 
preschool-aged children.28  In a per curiam opinion, the Court 
held “that persons of like qualifications [should] be given 
employment opportunities irrespective of their sex.”29  However, 
the Court held that “the existence of such conflicting family 
obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for 
a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis for 
distinction” in hiring practices.30  The Court reasoned that an 
employer could demonstrate that the hiring condition “is a bona 
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”31 
Seeing the potential for the entrenchment of a gender-based 
stereotype in Title VII case law, Justice Marshall wrote a special 
concurring opinion.32  He cautioned the Court not to “[fall] into 
the trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards about 
the proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination.”33  He  
 
 
 
26 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). 
27 Id. at 543. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 544. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32 Id. at 544–47 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
33 Id. at 545. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 144 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 144 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_SCOTT.DOC 3/24/16  12:13 AM 
676 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:671   
urged instead that employment opportunities should be limited 
“only by employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the 
applicant.”34 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,35 the Supreme Court broadened 
the scope of what constitutes discriminatory conduct that violates 
Title VII.  Justice Marshall joined a unanimous Court, which 
held that an employer violated Title VII when it utilized a 
facially neutral practice or procedure that was not justified out of 
business necessity and, in application, negatively impacted a 
particular group.36  The Court went further, holding that, based 
on the legislative history of the Act and guidelines issued by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), 
Congress did not require proof of discriminatory intent for a 
violation to occur under Title VII.37  The EEOC guidelines were 
an “administrative interpretation of the Act,” and “the enforcing 
agency is entitled to great deference.”38  The Court reasoned that 
the legislative history of the Act supported the guidelines issued 
by the EEOC, and, therefore, the guidelines should be treated as 
expressing the intent of Congress.39  Using the EEOC guidelines, 
the Court held that Congress intended Title VII to allow for “the 
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to 
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification.”40  Acknowledging the “built-in headwinds” facing 
minorities entering the workforce, in broadening Title VII to 
allow for facially neutral discrimination, the Court allowed for 
greater access to the remedial measures available under Title 
VII.41 
The holding in Griggs aligned with Justice Marshall’s prior 
work toward equalizing employment opportunities as a social 
engineer.  More importantly, Griggs allowed for an expansion of 
access to the courts under Title VII.  Justice Marshall joined in 
laying a foundation to construct a more equal workplace with 
“scores of cases involving many thousands of workers who ha[d] 
34 Id. at 547. 
35 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
36 Id. at 435 
37 Id. at 430, 434. 
38 Id. at 433–34. 
39 Id. at 434. 
40 Id. at 431. 
41 Id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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been denied jobs or promotions because of non-job-related tests 
which ha[d] come into widespread use since passage of Title VII 
in 1964.”42 
The Court continued to issue opinions that allowed for a 
“broad construction of Title VII . . . consistent with the Act’s 
remedial purposes.”43  In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,44 the 
Court demonstrated its commitment to expanding the right of 
employees to bring private suits against employers for 
discriminatory practices.45  Justice Marshall again joined a 
unanimous Court to hold that Title VII allowed an aggrieved 
party to seek redress through private action despite first 
pursuing arbitration under a nondiscrimination clause of a 
collective-bargaining agreement.46  The Court acknowledged that 
Title VII gave private litigants the power to “not only redress[] 
[their] own injur[ies] but also vindicate[] the important 
congressional policy against discriminatory employment 
practices.”47  The Court found that “the private right of action 
remains an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of 
Title VII” because an employee’s individual right to be free from 
discriminatory practices cannot be waived.48  If the collective-
bargaining process barred an employee’s right to bring a private 
suit under Title VII, it “would defeat the paramount 
congressional purpose behind Title VII.”49 
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.50 and 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,51 Justice Marshall authored 
opinions advocating for the broad interpretation of Title VII to 
achieve its remedial purpose.  In McDonald, two white employees 
were fired because of a theft for which they were held jointly and 
42 David J. Garrow, Toward a Definitive History of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 67 
VAND. L. REV. 197, 229–31 (2014) (quoting Supreme Court Bars Employment Tests 
That Result in Anti-Negro Discrimination, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1971, at 4) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
43 Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title 
VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1304–05 (1990). 
44 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
45 Id. at 45. 
46 Id. at 49. 
47 Id. at 45. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 51. 
50 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
51 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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severally liable with a black employee.52  Despite the shared 
liability, the white employees were fired and the black employee 
was not.53  The white employees brought an action for relief 
under Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination in the 
workplace.54  The Court was faced with the question of exactly 
which races Title VII was meant to protect from discrimination.55 
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall placed “racial 
discrimination in private employment against whites on the 
same terms as racial discrimination against nonwhites.”56  Even 
when “theft of property . . . [is a] . . . compelling basis for 
discharge[,] . . . this does not diminish the illogic in retaining 
guilty employees of one color while discharging those of another 
color.”57  By opening Title VII to include claims of racial 
discrimination to a majority group, Justice Marshall broadened 
the scope of Title VII to unprecedented breadth for individuals.  
Nearly any person can allege racial discrimination without first 
making a prima facie showing that he is a member of a racial 
minority, even in the wake of committing fireable offenses.58  
Consistent with Justice Marshall’s vision of equality, McDonald 
expanded the meaning of racial discrimination past the point of 
minority discrimination and allowed for completely equal access 
to the courts and relief under the Act. 
Meritor Savings Bank established that a claim of a hostile 
work environment due to sexual harassment is considered sexual 
discrimination and, thus, a violation of Title VII.59  The Court 
expanded the relief available to victims of hostile environment 
sexual harassment discrimination by holding that the 
discrimination did not have to have an economic effect on an 
employee to be actionable.60  The Court reinforced the power of 
the EEOC in holding that the 1980 guidelines issued by the 
agency “specifying that ‘sexual harassment,’ as there defined, is a 
form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII,” and since its 
52 McDonald, 427 U.S. at 276. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 279. 
57 Id. at 284. 
58 Michael J. Fellows, Note, Civil Rights—Shades of Race: An Historically 
Informed Reading of Title VII, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 387, 415 (2004). 
59 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986). 
60 Id. at 67–68. 
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issuance, “courts have uniformly held . . . that a plaintiff may 
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination 
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work 
environment.”61  The Court again refused to limit an employee’s 
ability to bring private suit under Title VII by finding that the 
“mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against 
discrimination,” regardless of whether the employee invoked the 
procedure, does not insulate an employer from liability.62  
However, the Court set limitations on the ability of an employee 
to initiate a sexual harassment claim.  The Court held that “[f]or 
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe 
or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment 
and create an abusive working environment.’ ”63  The Court 
further held that it would not issue a definitive ruling as to when 
an employer is liable for the actions of supervisors.64 
Justice Marshall concurred with the Court’s holding that 
hostile environment discrimination constituted sex 
discrimination as defined by Title VII.65  He reiterated his 
philosophy that every employee should have a workplace 
environment that is free from discriminatory practices by 
supporting the Court’s expansion of the definition of sex 
discrimination.  Justice Marshall, however, disagreed with the 
Court’s refusal to rule on employer liability absent actual 
knowledge of the harassment.66  Justice Marshall voiced his 
belief that, in analyzing employer liability under Title VII for the 
acts of employees, Title VII law clearly established that the act of 
a supervisory employee or agent is imputed to the employer.67  
His rejection of the Court’s agency theory in his concurrence 
demonstrates his staunch stance on further broadening the scope 
of Title VII and his ability to perceive the far-reaching 
ramifications of such a decision. 
61 Id. at 65–66. 
62 Id. at 72. 
63 Id. at 67 (second alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
64 Id. at 72. 
65 Id. at 74. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 74–75. 
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B. Pleading and Proof 
The Court also determined the pleading and proof 
requirements under Title VII during Justice Marshall’s tenure.  
The burden-of-pleading requirement functions to give parties to 
an action notice of what must be alleged in a complaint or answer 
to substantiate or rebuff the allegations.68  Burden-of-proof 
standards allow courts to determine which party in an action 
must present evidence and what evidence is necessary to support 
or rebut a claim of discrimination.69  Because Title VII did not 
address the requirements of proof and pleadings, the courts were 
left to determine the procedural framework intended by the 
statute.70  The constant battle to determine how one could 
procedurally bring forth and prove a Title VII claim marked 
Justice Marshall’s time on the Court.71  Justice Marshall 
advocated for lower pleading and proof requirements in keeping 
with his position that each citizen should have equal access to 
the courts, especially the federal court system, based on his view 
of the courts as the primary engine for social reform.72 
The most significant case to deal with pleading and proof 
standards during the Marshall Era was McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green.73  The Court granted certiorari “[i]n order to 
clarify the standards governing the disposition of an action 
challenging employment discrimination.”74  The Court reaffirmed 
an employee’s right to bring private suit under Title VII, holding 
that “a prior Commission determination of reasonable cause [is] 
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to raising a claim” under Title 
VII nor does the Act “restrict a complainant’s right to sue . . . and 
we will not engraft on the statute a requirement which may 
inhibit the review of claims of employment discrimination.”75   
 
 
 
68 Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: 
Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1216 (1981) 
[hereinafter Belton, Burdens of Pleading]. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1226. 
71 Id. at 1207–09.  
72 Banks, supra note 21.  
73 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
74 Id. at 798. 
75 Id. at 797–99. 
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The Court then established a three-prong proof and pleading test 
to determine the sufficiency of employment discrimination 
pleadings and the proof offered to substantiate claims and 
defenses.76 
First, the Court held that in a private Title VII suit, the 
employee has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case 
of discrimination against the employer.77  Under the second 
prong of the test, “[t]he burden . . . shift[s] to the employer to 
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”78 to justify 
its actions, effectively allowing the employer to rebut an 
employee’s claim of discrimination.79  The Court was careful to 
articulate that the inquiry did not end there.80  In other words, 
Title VII did not permit an employer to disguise discrimination 
by attempting to cover the discrimination with pretext.81  
Therefore, the Court identified a third prong that allowed an 
employee “a fair opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated 
reason for” its actions was, in fact, a pretext for discrimination 
and that a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employer’s action did not exist.82 
Justice Marshall joined the unanimous opinion in McDonnell 
Douglas that ultimately afforded plaintiff-employees both the 
opportunity to offer the initial proof and the power to rebut an 
employer’s pretextual justification.  The decision also gave courts 
the ultimate conclusive power to hear and determine the 
employer’s reasoning and the validity of the employer’s decision 
making.83  But while McDonnell Douglas set forth the general 
pleading requirements for Title VII cases, the Court began to 
carve out exceptions that did not garner Justice Marshall’s vote. 
 
76 Id. at 801–05. 
77 Id. at 802 (“This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial 
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued 
to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 802–03. 
80 Id. at 804. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication Principles in 
Disparate Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REV. 103, 122 (2005). 
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The Supreme Court decided its first religious discrimination 
case under Title VII in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.84  
Hardison defined religious discrimination under Title VII and set 
the standard of proof for claims involving collective-bargaining 
agreements.85  The Court held that “religion” encompasses 
religious observance and practice and that an employer must 
make reasonable accommodations for an employee, unless an 
employer demonstrates that it could not reasonably accommodate 
an employee without causing undue hardship on the employer’s 
business.86  Despite the efforts of Trans World Airlines (“TWA”), 
however, it could not reasonably accommodate Hardison’s 
religious requirements without violating the collective-
bargaining agreements between TWA and its employees.87  The 
Court found that TWA had adopted a neutral seniority system in 
order to comply with various collective-bargaining agreements.88  
The Court found that there was “no suggestion of discriminatory 
intent”89 in adopting the seniority system and concluded that 
TWA’s inability to reasonably accommodate Hardison’s religious 
practices could not be attributed to an intent to discriminate.90  
Rather, the collective-bargaining agreements, not the employer, 
determined when an employee was scheduled to work based on 
seniority, and TWA would be in violation of the agreement if it 
interfered to accommodate Hardison.91  The established 
“seniority system was not designed with the intention to 
discriminate against religion,”92 and thus, “absent a 
discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system 
cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system 
has some discriminatory consequences.”93  The Court held that 
under Title VII, TWA was not required to “carve out a special 
exception to its seniority system in order to help Hardison to 
meet his religious obligations.”94 
84 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977). 
85 Id. at 79, 81. 
86 Id. at 73–74. 
87 Id. at 82. 
88 Id. at 80–81. 
89 Id. at 82. 
90 Id. at 80–81. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 82 (quoting Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 887, 883 
(W.D. Mo. 1947)). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 83. 
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Justice Marshall vehemently dissented from the Court’s 
decision, arguing that the holding made “a mockery of the 
statute.”95  Justice Marshall’s dissent notes that “an employer 
cannot . . . sign[] a contract that precludes all reasonable 
accommodations”96 because doing so would have an impact on all 
of those “who do not observe the holy days on which most 
businesses are closed.”97  Justice Marshall felt that the Court’s 
interpretation of the statute effectively nullified Title VII by not 
allowing employees who belonged to unions with collective-
bargaining agreements to bring suit for discrimination without 
proof of discriminatory intent.98 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint99 also addressed proof 
requirements and marks one of Justice Marshall’s most 
significant dissenting opinions on Title VII.  Pullman-Standard 
brought to fruition Justice Marshall’s fear that the Court was 
systematically narrowing the scope of Title VII and constricting 
access to the courts by imposing more stringent proof standards.  
The Court reinforced its ruling in Hardison by holding, “[A]bsent 
a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system 
cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system 
has some discriminatory consequences.”100  Thus, whenever there 
is a challenge to a seniority system under Title VII, it will require 
a trial on the issue of discriminatory intent to determine whether 
the employer adopted the system “because of its racially 
discriminatory impact.”101 
Justice Marshall disagreed with the Court’s continued efforts 
to enforce stricter pleading and proof requirements on 
employees.102  He expressed his concern stating: 
[P]lacing such a burden on plaintiffs who challenge seniority 
systems with admitted discriminatory impact, a burden never 
before imposed in civil suits brought under Title VII, frustrates  
 
 
95 Id. at 88 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
96 Id. at 96. 
97 Id. at 85 (majority opinion). 
98 Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
99 456 U.S. 273 (1982). 
100 Id. at 277 (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 82) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 294–95 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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the clearly expressed will of Congress and effectively “freeze[s] 
an entire generation of . . . employees into discriminatory 
patterns that existed before the Act.”103 
The majority’s position directly conflicted with Justice Marshall’s 
jurisprudential philosophy that relaxed pleading and proof 
requirements ensured access to courts to effect social change.  
Instead, by increasing the burden of proof, the Court left 
potential victims of discrimination with less avenues to effect 
change and improve their position in the workplace. 
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States,104 the Court had to determine exactly what evidence could 
support allegations of discrimination.  The Court held that, as 
plaintiff, “the Government bore the initial burden of making out 
a prima facie case of discrimination.”105  The government then 
had the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the company’s regularly conducted and standard 
operating procedure was discriminatory.106  The Court approved 
the use of statistical proof to establish a prima facie case of 
systematic discrimination.107  The Court limited systematic 
discrimination to employer actions that occurred after the 
passage of Title VII, holding that “the routine application of a 
bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII” 
because Congress did not intend to destroy any “vested seniority 
rights of employees simply because their employer had engaged 
in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act.”108 
Although Justice Marshall concurred with the Court’s 
finding of discrimination based on the statistical evidence 
presented by the plaintiff, he once again warned the Court of the 
danger of failing to grant broad deference to the EEOC’s issued 
guidelines and to prior decisions that rejected upholding 
seniority systems that allow discriminatory practices.109  While 
this case appears to broaden the burden-of-proof evidentiary 
standards by allowing statistical evidence, Justice Marshall was 
quick to note that in Hardison, which was decided during the 
same term, the majority had simultaneously enfeebled the 
103 Id. at 295. 
104 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
105 Id. at 336. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 339. 
108 Id. at 352–53. 
109 Id. at 381 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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employee’s ability to make a prima facie case by disallowing the 
use of seniority rights systems as definitive proof of employment 
discrimination.110  Justice Marshall argued that the Court failed 
to consider the legislative history of the Act, which did not 
“support the conclusion that Congress intended to legalize 
seniority systems that perpetuate discrimination.”111  Justice 
Marshall further contended that the Court had not objectively 
examined the Act’s legislative history, and if it had, “it would 
have been compelled to reach the opposite conclusion.”112  The 
Court’s finding that seniority rights systems were not per se 
actionable under Title VII minimized the scope of Title VII and 
foreshadowed the narrowing interpretation of Title VII’s access 
and remedies.113 
III. THE CHANGING TIDES 
In its attempts to clarify Title VII, the Court created 
confusion over the procedural framework in discrimination 
cases.114  Cases such as Hardison, Pullman-Standard, and 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters led to inconsistencies in 
how lower courts determined what pleading burdens would be 
placed on employees and employers and what evidence could be 
offered to prove or rebut a claim of discrimination.  But as the 
Court gradually became more conservative, the pleading and 
proof standards became consistently more rigid.  For instance, 
the proof requirement established in McDonnell Douglas shifted 
from an employee having to rebut as pretextual an employer’s 
nondiscriminatory justification for its actions to requiring an 
employee to make a showing of definitive discriminatory 
intent.115  With the requirement of showing discriminatory 
intent, employment discrimination became nearly impossible to 
prove, and the power of Title VII effectively disappeared.116  But 
while the Court’s approach to pleadings and proof may have  
 
 
110 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 294 (1982) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
111 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 383. 
112 Id. at 384. 
113 Id. 
114 Belton, Burdens of Pleading, supra note 68, at 1208–09. 
115 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
116 Belton, Burdens of Pleading, supra note 68, at 1224–25. 
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changed, Justice Marshall continued to advocate for the 
McDonnell Douglas pleading standards and rejected the  
Court-compelled heightened burden of proof. 
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,117 the Court dealt 
with evidentiary standards as they applied to a claim of 
disparate impact under Title VII.118  A black female employee of 
Fort Worth Bank was denied a promotion to a supervisory 
position on four separate occasions in favor of white applicants.119  
The bank “had not developed precise and formal criteria for 
evaluating candidates for” promotions, but instead relied “on the 
subjective judgment of [white] supervisors who were acquainted 
with the candidates and with the nature of the jobs to be 
filled.”120  The employee brought a claim under Title VII, alleging 
that the bank’s promotion policies were racially discriminatory.121  
The Court had to determine how to analyze a disparate impact 
claim in which the employer used subjective criteria in 
determining promotions,122 stating that “[o]ur decisions have not 
addressed the question whether disparate impact analysis may 
be applied to cases in which subjective criteria are used to make 
employment decisions.”123  The Court held that “disparate impact 
analysis may in principle be applied to subjective as well as to 
objective practices.”124 
After the Court determined the proper analysis for subjective 
promotional practices, the Court then had to establish the 
appropriate evidentiary standard.125  The Court reaffirmed its 
decision in Teamsters by holding that “the plaintiff is required to 
prove that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or 
motive.”126  The Court reiterated the McDonnell Douglas  
three-prong proof and pleading test to analyze Title VII claims 
and extended its application to disparate impact cases.127  
However, the Court held that “[t]he ultimate burden of 
117 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
118 Id. at 982. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 983. 
122 Id. at 990–91. 
123 Id. at 989. 
124 Id. at 991. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 986. 
127 Id. at 985–86. 
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persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the 
plaintiff.”128  The Court acknowledged that by allowing the 
employer to use subjective tests for employment practices, 
employees faced a much higher burden to establish that the 
employment practices were intentionally discriminatory, as 
opposed to just preferential.129  This proof requirement allowed 
employers to have a lower burden in meeting the business 
necessity criteria.130  The Court justified requiring a higher 
burden for employees, holding that the shifting burden 
evidentiary standards sufficiently safeguarded Congress’s intent 
to ensure the strength of Title VII.131 
Justice Marshall joined in a concurring opinion, agreeing 
with the plurality’s judgment, but not with the allocation of 
burdens of proof.  The concurring Justices warned that “to lessen 
the employer’s burden of justifying an employment practice that 
produces a disparate impact simply because the practice relies 
upon subjective assessments” was inconsistent with the 
principles of Title VII.132  By “[a]llowing an employer to escape 
liability simply by articulating vague, inoffensive-sounding 
subjective criteria would disserve Title VII’s goal of eradicating 
discrimination in employment.”133  The Court’s ruling to allocate 
the ultimate burden of proof to the employee was contradicted by 
earlier rulings, and Justice Marshall reiterated that an employee 
“who successfully establishes [a] prima facie case shifts the 
burden of proof” to the employer to show that the employment 
practice is justified by business necessity and is not intentionally 
discriminatory.134 
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,135 the Court 
“completely dismantled the disparate impact theory.”136  The 
Court’s holding “made it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by adopting a 
more rigorous standard for the use of statistical evidence and 
128 Id. at 986 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
129 Id. at 994. 
130 Id. at 997–98. 
131 Id. at 993. 
132 Id. at 1009 (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1001. 
135 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
136 Belton, supra note 3, at 464. 
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substantially easing the burden of defendants to prove they meet 
the business necessity test.”137  The Court ruled that in a 
disparate impact claim brought pursuant to Title VII, an 
employee would have to show more than just a racial imbalance 
in the workforce.138  The Court held that the “plaintiff’s burden in 
establishing a prima facie case goes beyond the need to show that 
there are statistical disparities in the employer’s work force.”139  
Instead, the Court required an employee to show that the 
“application of a specific or particular employment 
practice . . . created the disparate impact under attack.”140  
Moreover, the Court made the plaintiff responsible “for isolating 
and identifying the specific employment practices that are 
allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.”141  
As if raising the plaintiff’s burden of proof was not enough, the 
Court lowered the employer’s proof requirements, holding that 
the business-necessity defense had “no requirement that the 
challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the 
employer’s business.”142  The Court found that a greater degree of 
scrutiny “would be almost impossible for most employers to meet, 
and would result in a host of evils.”143  By drastically shifting the 
burden of proof to the plaintiff, the majority opinion in Wards 
Cove all but made a claim under Title VII impossible for an 
employee to prove. 
Justice Marshall joined in a dissent, which ardently opposed 
the majority’s requirement that an employee prove an employer’s 
discriminatory intent.  According to the dissent, the issue was 
whether an employment practice has a significant, adverse effect 
on an identifiable class of workers, “regardless of the cause or 
motive for the practice.”144  The dissent contended that the 
majority’s decision rejected “the statutory construction that 
developed in the wake of Griggs” and found this disturbing 
because the decision in Griggs “correctly reflected the intent of 
the Congress that enacted Title VII.”145  The Wards Cove decision 
137 Id. at 466. 
138 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656–57. 
139 Id. at 656. 
140 Id. at 657. 
141 Id. at 656 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
142 Id. at 659. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
145 Id. at 672. 
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effectively amounted to “a rejection of a consistent interpretation 
of a federal statute.”146  The dissent concluded that the majority 
“[t]urn[ed] a blind eye to the meaning and purpose of Title VII, 
[and] the majority’s opinion perfunctorily reject[ed] a 
longstanding rule of law [which] underestimate[d] the probative 
value of evidence of a racially stratified work force.”147  Thus, 
where a plaintiff might have been granted deference in a factual 
analysis, the defendant now had the upper hand.148  As such, the 
Court’s analysis could arguably be as follows:  “Defendant’s 
validation data standing alone could be accepted.  Plaintiff’s 
challenge raises some serious doubts as to the probative value of 
defendant’s data.  But since I don’t know whose statistics are 
more accurate, and since plaintiff carries the burden of 
persuading me, and he didn’t, defendant wins.”149 
Finally, Justice Marshall joined the plurality in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.150  There, the plaintiff proved that she 
had been discriminated against on the basis of sex.151  The trial 
court found that remarks pertaining to the plaintiff, which were 
relied on to deny her a position as partner in the accounting firm, 
“stemmed from an impermissibly cabined view of the proper 
behavior of women.”152  The Court affirmed the lower court’s 
finding of discrimination but disagreed with the standard of proof 
the lower courts applied to the employer.153  Writing for the 
plurality, Justice Brennan explained: 
The courts below held that an employer . . . must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that it would have made the same 
decision in the absence of discrimination.  We are persuaded 
that the better rule is that the employer must make this 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence.154 
 
 
 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 663. 
148 Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 36. (1989). 
149 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
151 Id. at 251. 
152 Id. at 236–37. 
153 Id. at 252–53. 
154 Id. 
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Just as Justice Marshall took the position that the burden of 
proof for the plaintiff in making a prima facie case should be 
reasonable, he took the same position on employers, rejecting the 
higher clear and convincing standard of proof.155 
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 AND  
JUSTICE MARSHALL’S VINDICATION 
To counter the Court’s decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio,156 portions of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,157 and other 
employment discrimination cases in which Justice Marshall took 
issue with the majority view,158 Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, completely invalidating the precedent set by these 
cases.159  Congress explicitly stated its intentions for the Act:  
The purposes of this Act are— 
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional 
discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace; 
(2) to codify the concepts of “business necessity” and “job 
related” enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court 
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 
642 (1989); 
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory 
guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under 
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); 
and 
155 Id. at 253. 
156 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
157 While Congress upheld the preponderance of evidence burden of proof, it 
rejected that portion of the decision that created the “same decision” defense. This 
defense allowed an employer to prove that it would have reached the same decision 
regarding the employee’s status absent any discriminatory considerations. But this 
defense not only allowed an employer to limit the remedy, it also operated as a 
complete defense to liability. See Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the 
Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 
205, 211–14 (2007). 
158 Congress also reversed Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 
(1989) (holding that an employee could not sue for damages under section 1981 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in relation to conditions of employment caused by racial 
harassment), and Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761–62 (1989) (permitting white 
firefighters to challenge a consent decree in a case to which they had not been 
parties). 
159 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by 
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to 
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.160 
Congress drew from Griggs in restoring a plaintiff’s power in 
disparate impact cases by allowing the plaintiff to allege 
discriminatory impact as a basis for a Title VII claim without a 
requisite showing of intent.161  The Act expanded civil rights 
statutes and allowed for greater access to the courts, which 
Justice Marshall strongly advocated for under Title VII cases.  
Justice Marshall’s view on the burden allocated to the employer 
was also incorporated into the Act.  The Act “imposes on the 
employer the burden of persuasion for business necessity and job 
relatedness”162 and holds an employer liable for a claim under 
Title VII if that employer “fails to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity.”163  By doing so, Congress 
affirmed Justice Marshall’s interpretation of Title VII regarding 
burdens of proof and pleading for both parties. 
CONCLUSION 
As written, Title VII set forth the lofty goal of combating 
various forms of discrimination in the workplace but gave little 
guidance to the courts on the requirements for effective 
enforcement of the Act.164  This left the Supreme Court to define 
what constituted discrimination that violated Title VII and 
determine the scope of the statute.165  Of most significance, Title 
VII did not give statutory guidance on how to plead and prove a 
violation; nor did it address specifically when an employer would 
be liable under Title VII.166  The initial decisions issued by the 
Court broadened the scope of Title VII and attempted to 
eliminate the ambiguity in the statute, making it easier for an 
employee to seek redress under Title VII. 
160 Id. § 3. 
161 Id. § 105. 
162 Charles B. Hernicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: From Conciliation to 
Litigation—How Congress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, 141 MIL. L. REV. 1, 
31 (1993). 
163 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
164 Turner, supra note 1, at 427–28. 
165 Elizabeth Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacement of Conflict, 6 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1996). 
166 Id. at 4–5. 
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The early opinions of the Court also aligned with Justice 
Marshall’s jurisprudence and supported the theory of social 
engineering by broadening equal access to the courts.  As the 
Court became increasingly more conservative, it issued a number 
of opinions making Title VII violations more difficult to prove.  
As access to courts became more restricted, Justice Marshall 
found his position on the Court shifting towards concurrence and 
dissent.  Justice Marshall wrote to ensure that Title VII was 
enforced as Congress intended. 
Congress vindicated Justice Marshall and the early Court 
decisions by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to combat 
pervasive and entrenched racial discrimination in employment 
“by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order 
to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”167  It 
is fitting that Justice Marshall joined the majority or concurred 
in those cases that established reasonable proof and pleading 
standards that made seeking judicial relief less formidable.  In 
doing so, Justice Marshall and his colleagues expanded Title VII 
so that modern social engineers have the necessary tools to bring 
discrimination cases and the ability to use established precedent 
to construct a more equal workplace.168 
 
167 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071. 
168 Garrow, supra note 42, at 230–31. 
